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Abstract: Philosophy concerns asking fundamental questions about practices: their 
meaning, how they function, what they presuppose and what makes them distinctive. 
Within CW, we often ask about the effectiveness of the workshop, classroom activities 
or we inquire about out subject’s past and present distinctiveness. But the question of a 
philosophy or philosophies of CW has gone largely unasked. This paper considers a 
number of questions about how CW articulates itself in terms of its view of teaching, 
autonomy and the scope of CW research. The paper argues that if CW is to be an 
autonomous discipline, then various problems need to be addressed. It concludes by 
identifying two current schools, or philosophies, of CW: Integrationism and 
monarchism. Whereas the latter seeks to rationalise CW as an autonomous discipline, the 
former seeks to see it as part of a broader education in the humanities.  Ultimately, the 
paper seeks to create a framework for a new area of investigation in CW scholarship.  
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The philosophy of creative writing 
 
Creative Writing has a problem. This is certainly not a problem of popularity, for as 
Moxley notes, ‘[w]hile 40 years ago there were only about 40 programs in creative writing 
registered with the Association of Writing Programs, now there are over 400 to choose 
from’ (Moxley in Donnelly (ed.) 2010, 235).  Neither is it a problem that is widely 
acknowledged by teachers of CW: ‘many creative writing teachers still do not avail 
themselves of the growing body of scholarship on the teaching of creative writing 
(Vanderslice in Donnelly (ed.) 2010, 33). And finally, it is not a problem that those who 
study CW may be aware of. This problem seems invisible. Is it then a problem? 
 Sometimes, when problem becomes a norm it goes unnoticed. What might 
problematic from the outside might be another day at the office for someone else. 
Therefore, when I claim that CW has a problem, I mean that its objectives, pedagogies, 
the expectations of students and the view of CW within circles of academic management 
contain tensions, cross-purposes and lacks of clarity. One only needs to consider the 
recent Kurishei-inspired debates (and in some cases, rants) about creative writing to note 
that while there are questions in any discipline, there are certainly pressing and 
unresolved issues about the very existence of CW. 
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 That this is the case is not to deny that CW has an intellectual history. Indeed 
Myers in The Elephants Teach (2008) does an excellent job of showing that it has a history 
and Paul Dawson in his Creative Writing and the New Humanities (2005) does an even better 
job of showing that it has an intellectual history. The crisis is not simply one of scholarly 
background. The crisis, I argue, is of a philosophical nature and this paper is an attempt 
to gain some clarity of a number of issues which concern CW as a discipline and an 
activity.  
 Creative writers though are not in general philosophers and even philosophers 
will be (often painfully) aware that what philosophy is, is itself a site of debate. Let me be 
as clear as I can then. By ‘philosophy’ I mean the asking and answering of questions 
fundamental, or very important to the nature of something. Philosophy asks things such 
as, ‘what is X?’, ‘how is X, X?’ and ‘what role does Px have to play in X being X?’ So, 
putative philosophical questions about CW would be, ‘What is Creative Writing?’ and 
‘How is Creative Writing Creative Writing?’, and about how ideas of text, author and 
teaching contribute to what CW is.  
 To give an answer to all these is of course beyond the scope of this paper, but I 
do intend to outline how the asking and answering of such questions is useful and indeed 
necessary if we are to better communicate our ideas about our subject. My paper will 
move in three stages. I begin by discussing an underformulated issue within CW, but one 
central to the philosophy of education: the function of teaching. I distinguish between 
the concepts of ‘training’ and ‘education’ to show that CW pedagogy has generally not 
marked an important distinction which might help it answer more fundamental questions 
about its existence and purpose.   
Next, I move on to consider the important issue of the autonomy of CW. A 
variety of works such as Donnelly’s Establishing Creative Writing as an Academic Discipline 
and Dawson (2005) have dealt in some ways with this issue and I consider it to show 
how attempts to frame the autonomy of CW need to consider certain questions if they 
are to avoid philosophical problems.  
 To contextualise and exemplify this discussion, I then move to the idea of 
research and scholarship. Here I argue that conceptions and aspirations for research in 
CW are notably self-referential and concerned with pedagogy and history1. This, I link 
                                                          
1 For example, at the Great Writing conference 2014 where a draft of this paper was first delivered, I found 
a notice about NAWE’s new journal, Writing in Practice, among whose principal aims are ‘critical 
examination of the history and pedagogy of Creative Writing’ (NAWE, online). 
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back to the issue of the push for the autonomy of CW and discuss how research to date 
in CW compares to scholarship within the wider humanities.  
 In my conclusion, I draw together my arguments on autonomy, research and 
teaching to give an outline of the present philosophical landscape of CW. This picture 
will be an attempt to define ‘schools’ within CW, a tentative but necessary step in 
exploring the philosophy and theory of creative writing.  
   
Teaching, training and education 
 
We can use words such as ‘teach’ and ‘learn’ in haphazard ways, as we might say that ‘Mr 
Corruption earns £4.1 million a year’ when we really mean that he does not earn that 
amount at all, rather merely gets or receives that amount. In such cases our imprecision 
in usage can occlude a conceptual distinction. Such, I argue is the case with the concept 
of ‘teaching’ in CW, where the perennial question, ‘Can it be taught?’ betrays such a lack 
of conceptual specificity.  
 I wish to split ‘teaching’ into two categories; that of ‘training’ and ‘education’. 
Training is the teaching of someone to do certain highly specifiable tasks. For example, 
we are trained to replace spark plugs in an engine or to perform CPR on a non-respiring 
individual. Training is not only highly specifiable, but it also possesses a means/ends 
distinction: what I do during CPR (the means) is distinct from saving someone’s life as a 
result of CPR (the end). 
 Contrast training with what I am calling ‘education’. Education in the sense that I 
am using it means the cultivation of someone’s ability to understand, retain, associate, 
and reflect on ideas. Education teaches the learner to learn. Unlike training, education is 
not directed towards a highly specifiable goal. Education also does not possess the kind 
of means/ends distinction characteristic of training. This means that being educated is 
part of the ends of education.  
If this sounds all too woolly, consider the following. We might draw an analogy 
between education and sex with respect to a means/ends distinction. One can have sex 
to produce a child, say, or to earn one’s living, and here there is a means/end distinction. 
Contrariwise, one can have sex for pleasure, for the strengthening of bonds or for the 
exploration of one’s sexuality. Here, the means are at least partly constitutive of the ends. 
The alcoholic knows a means/ends distinction when it comes to the sauce, but the boozy 
celebrant has the end within the means. This also gives us a clue as to why education 
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does not have a highly specifiable goal, unless we mean ‘well-roundedness’, ‘curiosity’, 
‘autonomy’ and other non-specific qualities. Because in education the means are partly 
constitutive of the ends, the ends must be open-ended, subject to expansion, revision 
and questioning. 
Such a distinction between training and education is familiar within the 
philosophy of education. R.S. Peters has claimed that, ‘the trained artist, or scientist, or 
historian is not necessarily an educated man; for he may have a deep but circumscribed 
understanding in these spheres’ (Peters in Peters (ed.) 1973, 19) and he sees ‘the 
impossibility of conceiving of educational processes in accordance with a means-end 
model’ (Peters in Peters (ed.) 1973, 24). Here, education is a bifurcation of depth and 
breadth of knowledge and passions. It is also an inculcation into a worthwhile form of 
life, part of which is itself constituted by enabling students to inquire about what might 
or might not be worthwhile. For a trainee on the other hand, considerations and 
explorations of worthwhileness may be disruptive. For example, the consideration of the 
worthwhileness of car mechanics might well get in the way of changing spark plugs 
philosophical reflection during the performance of CPR might well be fatal.  
 Such a distinction is recognised, though often implicitly, in discussions of CW. 
For example, Haake has claimed that CW graduates ‘may write very well in a particular 
mode- they may even be said to have found ‘a voice’. But they have not been well served 
because they lack the skills to frame the next problem or take either their writing or, as 
importantly, their reading into and beyond what they don’t know how to do yet’ (Haake 
in Donnelly 2010, 187). Here, Haake describes students that may well have been trained, 
but have not been well educated. Also when Fenza talks about CW, ‘inspiring, exercising, 
and strengthening the efficacy of the human will to do good, to make a meaningful 
difference in art and in society’ (Fenza 2000, Online 1), he is certainly not talking about 
training. 
 The importance of marking such a conceptual distinction in the case of CW is 
firstly to recognise that a philosophical approach can help us get clearer about what CW 
is and our pedagogical aims. Secondly, once the distinction is made it can also show us 
that may we have been looking at this issue for some time, but by flagging up the issue, 
we can bring it into shaper focus and consider if creative writing is training or education 
and if it should be training or education.  
 At the end of this paper I will return to the question of teaching. I now move on 
to the question of disciplinary autonomy, as I argue the two are intertwined.  
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The craving for autonomy  
 
In her book Establishing Creative Writing Studies as an Academic Discipline (2012), Donnelly 
seeks to investigate CW pedagogies with a view to creating a new subject: creative writing 
studies. Such a move is a response to the fact that CW has been kept ‘from achieving any 
central core in the academy’ (Donnelly 2012, 2). She stresses (following Ritter (2001)) 
that the subject should, ‘establish markers of professional difference… [t]he academic 
goal of creative writing studies is to stand alongside composition studies and literary studies 
and any other university field of study as a separate-but-equal discipline’ (Donnelly 2012, 
2). 
 This desire to achieve ‘markers of professional difference’ and give ‘academic 
legitimacy to the discipline’ (Donnelly 2012, 148) is a common aspiration and while 
arguably achieved, is still a question that concerns many CW scholars. As Dawson notes, 
‘Creative Writing now seems to be situated as a separate stream alongside English and 
Cultural Studies rather than being integrated with them’ (Dawson 2005, 155) and Bizzaro 
asserts CW, ‘is more than a hybrid of literary and composition studies; it is an 
autonomous field with a right to its own history, epistemology, and classroom activities’ 
(Bizzaro in Donnelly (ed.) 2010, 37). Interestingly, such an assertion is similar to 
Saussure’s wish for his proposed science of semiotics. In his introduction to the Course in 
General Linguistics, Saussure claimed that while his science did not yet exist, ‘it has a right 
to exist, a place ready for it in advance’ (Saussure 2006 [1922], 15-16). This is interesting 
because such assertions within nascent academic disciplines are often just that: assertions. 
They constitute an academic will-to-power. That such a will-to-power is in use is evident 
when Bizzaro goes on to admit that it is not yet clear how creative writing is 
autonomous, but ‘if creative writing is an autonomous field of study, it will differ in some 
fundamental ways from literary and composition studies’ (Bizzaro in Donnelly (ed.) 2010, 
38). The answer to the ways in which is does differ are not made clear.  
It is true then that there is a concern that CW be autonomous and that through 
autonomy, obtain an equality with other subjects. This is a strategy other subjects have 
attempted and it can be problematic. The problem is that the putative subject can have 
an unhealthy reliance, in association or disassociation, with other subject areas. Let me 
illustrate by returning to linguistics. Linguistics in the mid-nineteenth century sought to 
be a ‘proper’ science and thus obtain autonomy, which required a reliance on physics as a 
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paradigm science. This led to a fairly fruitless struggle to formulate exceptionless 
universal laws governing sound change and other linguistic phenomena2. The point is 
that in seeking autonomy, one can inherit philosophical commitments that can be 
unhelpful and even conflict with one’s overt intentions and aspirations.  
Is this the case with creative writing? To give an initial answer, one should look at 
the way in which creative writing’s raison d’etre is articulated. For example, William Dick 
has claimed that CW, ‘should be autonomous and not part of the English department. It 
should be run by writers for writers’ (quoted in Dawson 2005, 131) and Fenza claims that 
CW is there for, ‘the education of artists and the making of art. Failure is an undeniable 
part of the process’ (Fenza 2000, Online). Here we have a very common conception that 
CW is there to make writers, a conception that sometimes relies on analogies with the 
conservatoire or fine art course.  
 Now, Fenza is correct about the failure of CW courses to make writers and he is 
also correct to go on to note that such failure is shared with acting schools, dance 
schools and the like. However, it is worth considering if the other humanities are equally 
failures, at least if the purpose of English is to produce English scholars and Philosophy, 
philosophers. It matters little about the actual numbers; the point is that most humanities 
students do not become professionals within their subject area and we don’t judge the 
humanities as failures because of this.  
 This though is perfectly natural. That philosophy graduates rarely become 
philosophers is no scandal because philosophy does not have the express purpose of 
making professional philosophers. It does though have the express purpose of getting 
students to think critically, reflectively, logically and immanently about problems, 
themselves and the world around them. In contrast, because CW very often sets itself up 
as writer training, being ‘by writers for writers’, it also sets itself up for failure and 
moreover failure on its own self-selected ground. This being the case, we might then 
consider why it is that CW sometimes can’t or won’t align itself with other subjects, why 
it seems orientated toward a means-end distinction in being training for writers.  
 This leads us back to the question of autonomy. CW is peculiar within the 
academy and its peculiarity is often related to its claims for autonomy. This is evident in 
discussion of the workshop. For example is has been claimed that, ‘the Workshop is us’ 
(Beck 2006, 213) and that ‘[w]orkshops are the beating heart of creative writing’ (Roe in 
Donnelly (ed.) 2010, 194). It is unsurprising then that Wandor refers to the workshop as 
                                                          
2 For example see Jordan-Baker (2013), Robins (1997) and Seuren (1997). 
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something which constitutes ‘the institutional distinctiveness of CW as an academic 
discipline’ (Wandor 2008, 120). 
 The workshop model as both stamp of professional difference and the pervasive 
pedagogical staple on CW courses3 is a corollary of the fact that CW courses are seen as 
being there to train writers. Indeed if this were not so, CW’s claims for institutional 
distinctiveness might be put in jeopardy. This is made quite clear when Dawson argues 
that ‘[i]mproved literary appreciation is a valid by-product of a workshop-based writing 
course, but it not a sustainable justification for the existence of Creative Writing as a 
discipline’ (Dawson 2005, 163). Of course, if CW were not there to train writers, but, say, 
to cultivate a passion for literature and an appreciation of the human condition, one 
might respond that this was the job of literature academics, which would leave CW in 
direct competition with another subject. In such a case, we would have failed to provide 
what Donnelly sees as the much needed ‘academic legitimacy to the discipline’ (Donnelly 
2012, 148). 
 I now wish to expand into the question of research in to show that here too, the 
desire for autonomy arguably influences how research and scholarship are perceived.  
 
Research in creative writing  
 
In both discussions and practice of research in CW, there is a consistent self-
referentiality.  Again Donnelly gives a useful account of the current state of affairs when 
she claims, ‘research leads to creative writing as knowledge and, as teachers, we should 
want at the least, to be informed about our pedagogy’ (Donnelly 2012, 124) and she 
advises ‘more training of graduate creative writing students in the history and practice of 
the field’ (Donnelly, 2012, p.125). As well as this, a series of publications (Beck 2012; 
Donnelly (ed.) 2010; Bishop and Ostrom (eds.) 1994; Moxley 1989) attest to the fact that 
the academic field of CW has a marked pedagogical and historical emphasis.  
What this situation suggests is that the object for CW research is very often itself; 
its pedagogy and history. Of course, this is part of the scholarship in any field, be it 
Eagleton’s The Function of Criticism (2000 [1984]) or Bertrand Russel’s A History of Western 
Philosophy (2004 [1945]). However, research in English and Philosophy is typically 
directed to understanding its objects of knowledge through analysis, argument, 
                                                          
3 This claim is based on research carried out by Donnelly (2012). For example, her survey found that, ‘[t]he 
[workshop model] serves as a primary focus or a major component in 80% of creative writing classes’ (75) 
and she quotes sources that claim overall, CW courses consist of 50% workshop (78).  
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scholarship and the proposal of new theories. Such aspirations in CW however are not 
salient.  
Arguably, this is because CW’s research aspirations are articulated in such a way 
as to cause no conflict with its claims distinctiveness its desire for secure autonomy. This 
self-consciousness can be seen when Donnelly discusses creative writing research: ‘What 
we need to know about creative writing and research is how to facilitate a better 
understanding of creative writing’s particular modes of research’ (Donnelly 2012, 126). 
Here we see that a desire to make CW autonomous is coupled with uncertainty about 
what makes CW autonomous and there is an advocating of research on the kind of 
research CW should do in order to distinguish itself. Such a claim is repeated by Bizzaro 
when he states, ‘one of the many tasks awaiting new scholars in creative writing studies is 
the determination of what is uniquely the province of creative writing’ (Bizzaro in 
Donnelly (ed.) 2010, 45). While academic will-to-power is being enacted within CW, it is 
accompanied by confusion about the philosophical basis for that action.  
It might be objected though that such a situation is rather benign and necessary. 
Necessary in the sense that all disciplines need to engage with questions about what 
makes them them. Such attempts though risk putting the desire for autonomy before 
other concerns, even to the extent that one might sculpt research and course design on 
the basis of it being different, as opposed to true, intelligent, well organised and 
philosophically cogent. This will-to-power might be understandable, it can make difficult 
an investigation of the presuppositions that constitute the philosophy of that subject.  
Our discussion of autonomy is not only confined to how it is reflected in 
conceptions of scholarship and research, but also to the question of teaching. That is, 
should CW be training or education? Royster mentions being ‘trained as a writer’ 
(Royster in Donnelly (ed.) 2010, 105) though Myers reminds us, ‘[o]riginally the teaching 
of creative writing…was an experiment in education…it was not a scheme for turning 
out official writers’ (Myers 2006, 4). This is an open question, but it makes sense that if 
CW is training for writers, rather than education for students of the humanities, CW has 
a marker of professional difference from literature, composition and media. To 
emphasise this link between the issue of teaching and autonomy, I repeat my quote from 
Dawson: ‘[i]mproved literary appreciation is a valid by-product of a workshop-based 
writing course, but it not a sustainable justification for the existence of Creative Writing 
as a discipline’ (Dawson 2005, 163). 
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Conclusion: Integrationists and monarchists 
 
So far, I have attempted to show that by asking philosophical questions about CW, we 
can clarify some issues and show the conceptual links between ideas; in this case, the 
links between disciplinary autonomy, teaching, research and some of the ways in which 
the desire for autonomy might influence the aforementioned. In my closing remarks, I 
wish express the practical result of these links by outlining what I see as an important 
dividing line in CW, an outline that might help structure future questions and debates.  
I want to suggest that there are currently two schools of thought on the direction 
of CW. One camp, which I will name the ‘integrationists’, stress the need for CW to be 
linked with other subjects such as literature, composition or media. This is due to the 
sharing or reliance on their objects of knowledge, technical vocabulary and intellectual 
skills as opposed, pace Dawson, to the idea there is a ‘fundamental conflict between 
writers and critics over the nature of literature (Dawson 2005, 161). Here, CW can be 
seen as what Wandor terms, ‘extrinsically incomplete’ (Wandor 2008, 216-217) and there 
is no necessary requirement that CW be or become an autonomous discipline. Such 
people, at least to my mind, include Norman Foerster4, Michelene Wandor and 
Katherine Haake5. I also include myself among their number.  
The other camp I call ‘monarchists’ because of their stress on the need for 
creative writing to be an autonomous discipline with a series of markers of professional 
difference spanning pedagogy, training, and research. That is, they wish creative writing 
to be sovereign, and though this sovereign might take advice from its subjects Literature, 
Composition and Media, and this hierarchy secures the autonomy of CW within its own 
disciplinary boundaries. I consider Diane Donnelly, Patrick Bizzaro and Kelly Ritter6 to 
be among the creative writing monarchists.  
 Within my two camps there will doubtless be differences and disagreements: 
about the role of the workshop, the nature of creativity, the status of research and so on. 
But my arguments suggest there are such camps and this is so because there are different 
                                                          
4 ‘As a humanist Foerster believed that writers required a humanistic education that would give them a 
permanent sense of literary tradition…[t]he larger purpose…behind Foerster’s whole plan of literary 
education was to rediscover critical standards’ (Myers 2008, 135).   
5 ‘It is not such a stretch, after all, to construe Creative Writing as ideally situated to integrate all the strands 
of English studies as a nexus of both reading and writing’ (Haake in Beck (ed.) 2012, 134). 
6 ‘My argument here is limited to Ph.D. programs in creative writing only, as I would argue that in order to 
exist, Ph.D. programs must account for their identity by building markers of professional difference in 
their candidates’ (Ritter 2001, 208). 
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philosophical positions about the nature of literature, the human subject, and creative 
writing. I’ve only been able to sketch some of the differences in this paper, but I hope I 
have shown how a philosophical consideration of CW can yield some clarity and further 
questions for the development of the field, in whatever direction(s). As Gross has rightly 
suggested of CW, ‘[w]hatever it is, it has to be aware of what that is, and why’ [author’s 
emphasis] (Gross in Donnelly (ed.) 2010, p.57). This is why a philosophy of creative 
writing is desirable. 
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